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abstract
Within the organisational development people’s arguments rise from their personal or group interests, 
which in turn are based on the systemic differentiation of society and technology at a given time. We 
face a crucial issue: Must we accept separated group interests as inescapable circumstances, or can 
we reach out for universal human interests? This chapter addresses the issue combining Rawls’ idea of 
an original position behind a veil of ignorance with Habermas’ concepts of communicative rationality 
and discourse.
INtrODUctION
Planners and decision makers encounter compet-
ing interests that emerge from the division of la-
bour and of our economic system, but the interests 
do not provide any rationally motivated legitima-
tion basis for planning. People’s arguments rise 
from their personal or group interests, which in 
turn are based on the systemic differentiation of 
society and technology at a given time. The group 
interests and the division of labour reproduce 
each other all the time, technology often being 
the major driving force behind the new division 
of labour. The choice between technological 
alternatives is an ethical issue because it affects 
people’s rights and position in the organization 
in question, as well as through its products and 
side effects external society and, in the long run, 
also future generations. The focus of this chap-
ter is inside organizations, but we briefly touch 
upon the broader perspective in the discussion 
on future trends.
The theoretical background of rational plan-
ning has two main sources, the economists’ notion 
of rational decision making and the systems ap-
proach (March, 1982, Simon, 1982, Churchman, 
1968). Planning theorists with a more practical 
stance have been looking for a theoretical basis 
for planning professionals. Planning theorists take 
into account the multi-agency view of decision 
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making, and the planner should bring different 
political and technical aspects of relevant alterna-
tives into the open (Faludi, 1973), or even demand 
that the planner should take an active political 
role so as to defend the interest of the oppressed 
(Forester, 1989). 
We face a crucial issue: must we accept 
separated group interests as inescapable circum-
stances, or can we reach out for universal human 
interests? The situation is a challenge for rational 
argumentation, since, if there is a possibility of a 
generalized interest, it is only rational argumenta-
tion that can lead us out of the dilemma. By means 
of the accounts of two outstanding thinkers of last 
century we can address the problem of the univer-
salisation of interest: Habermas and Rawls. 
raWLs
Rawls (1973) derives his theory of justice, justice 
as fairness, through a very simple but powerful 
concept of rational choice in an ideal ‘original 
position behind a veil of ignorance’. His aim is 
to derive principles of justice that equal, rational 
persons would agree on when they do not know 
their share of the utilities ensuing from the prin-
ciples and their social circumstances or personal 
characteristics. The veil of ignorance guarantees 
the universalisation of the principles. When the 
participants do not know their social position or 
any personal characteristics, they are in a position 
to think of the principles from the generalised 
position of any rational decision maker. They 
can only make their decision with regard to the 
principles of justice, not their contingent natural 
fortune (p. 18). Rawls sees the original position as 
a procedural interpretation of Kant’s categorical 
imperative (p. 256).
Their rational choice will then be to define 
justice as fairness. Rawls (1973) derives two basic 
principles of justice. (1) The principle of liberty 
says: “Each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive basic liberty compatible with 
a similar liberty for other” (p. 60). (2) The dif-
ference principle states: “Social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advan-
taged and (b) attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity” (p. 83, also p. 302). Accordingly, the 
optimum configuration of economy is achieved 
at the maximum point of the least advantaged 
members. The principles are arranged by two 
priority rules: (1) According to ‘the priority of 
liberty’, liberty can only be restricted for the 
sake of liberty. (2) According to ‘the priority of 
justice over efficiency and welfare’, the equality 
of opportunities is prior to the welfare of the least 
advantaged (p. 302). Partly due to the criticism of 
his ‘Theory of Justice’, Rawls gave up the central 
role of the above two principles in his work Political 
Liberalism (1993) without abandoning the idea of 
the original position. (For discussion on Rawls, 
see Freeman, 2003). Rawls’ later work expanded 
the view from the rules of a democratic state to 
the rules of nations (Rawls, 1993) and between 
nations (Rawls, 1999), so his views have hardly 
been discussed at all in a limited organisational 
context, which is our aim in this paper.
In his later work Rawls (1993) accepted it as 
a fact that people can adhere to different notions 
of freedom, due to, for instance, their religion. 
In this context we can leave the detailed debate 
concerning the above principles aside, although 
they are most interesting from the point of view 
of ethics in general. The second principle also ad-
dresses technology as it replaces Pareto optimality 
as the notion of efficiency. (An economic situation 
is Pareto optimal, if it cannot be changed for the 
benefit of anyone without worsening it for some-
one else.) Efficiency as a driving force of social 
development will be discussed briefly below, but 
we focus on Rawls’ idea of ‘the original position 
behind a veil of ignorance’. The notion of the 
original position was challenged by Habermas’ 
communicative rationality.
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HabErMas
During the 1970’s Habermas worked out a theory 
of communicative action which was summed up 
in two volumes published in German in 1981, 
and in translations into English in 1984 and 1987 
(Habermas, 1984, 1987). One of the basic no-
tions of his theory is communicative rationality. 
Habermas (1984, 75) characterises communicative 
rationality in the following way:
We can begin with the claim that the concept of 
communicative rationality has to be analysed in 
connection with achieving understanding in lan-
guage. The concept of reaching an understanding 
suggests a rationally motivated agreement among 
participants that is measured against criticisable 
validity claims. The validity claims (propositional 
truth, normative rightness, and subjective truth-
fulness) characterise different categories of a 
knowledge embodied in symbolic expressions.
The idea of discourse put forward by Haber-
mas (1973 and 1984) can be summed up in the 
notions of an ideal speech situation, levels of 
discourse and validity claims which stand up with 
rationally motivated agreement. The ideal speech 
situation presupposes a certain kind of process 
and procedure according to which discussants 
conduct argumentative speech (1984, 25). The 
process guarantees the participants’ symmetrical 
and equal chances to express their opinions and 
raise questions about any issue (Habermas, 1973). 
Argumentation excludes all force but the force of 
the better argument. In a discourse “participants 
[…] test with reasons, and only with reasons, 
whether the claim defended by the proponents 
rightfully stands or not” (1984, 25). Habermas’ 
idea of discourse comes close to Argyris and 
Schön’s Model II theory of action (Schön 1983, 
230 ff.). Habermas’ theory partly emerges from 
the criticism of instrumental reason in the spirit 
of the Frankfurt school of thought (Habermas, 
1968 and 1981, cf. Marcuse, 1968). Habermas’ 
theory of communicative action has raised discus-
sion within one field of technology, information 
systems (Lyytinen & Hirschheim, 1989, Klein & 
Hirschheim, 1991). 
In accordance with the idea of communicative 
rationality, Habermas (1983) replaces Kant’s mon-
ological universalisation principle (which does not 
require a discourse to back it up), as expressed 
in the categorical imperative with the principle 
of universality that is based on formal conditions 
of discourse. His universalisation principle says 
(1983, 75) that any valid norm must satisfy the 
condition that the consequences which follow 
from the fact that individuals generally keep the 
norm when they strive for their particular interests 
must be submitted to the acceptance of all those 
affected. Habermas sees this universalisation 
principle as compelling each participant to take 
others into account as well, i.e. it leads to what 
Mead has called ‘ideal role-taking’. Each partici-
pant in the discourse must have an opportunity 
to express his or her ideas, so that consensus is 
a result of real argumentation. A discourse will 
bring about a consensus through the force of the 
better argument. We may ask, however, what it 
is that can provide moral discourse with better 
arguments. Rawls has given a plausible, at least 
a partial answer.
UNIvErsaLIsatION IN a rEaL 
DIscOUrsE
Habermas (1983, 76) explicitly contrasts his no-
tion of ethics with that of Rawls, and criticises the 
latter’s view of a fictitious original position and 
the monological basis of his ethics. Habermas has 
himself been criticised for assuming a fictitious 
situation in which all those affected could take 
part in an ideal speech situation (Ulrich, 1983). 
Not all people can be expected to meet formal 
requirements of rational argumentation, and fu-
ture generations cannot in principle take part in 
decisions that influence their lives. It is obvious 
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that the ideal process in which everyone can take 
part (also an ideal assumption) does not guarantee 
rational motivation as such, nor does it serve as a 
better argument. In practice, a dialogue naturally 
has a greater chance of achieving a just solution 
than monological, theoretical contemplation.
Rawls (1995) also directly denies Habermas 
criticism on monological ethics: “The point of view 
of civil society includes all citizens. Like Hab-
ermas’ ideal discourse situation, it is a dialogue, 
indeed, an omnilogue” (p. 140). Rawls explains 
this further in a footnote: 
Habermas sometimes says that the original po-
sition is monological and not dialogical; that is 
because all the parties have, in effect, the same 
reasons and so they select the same principles. 
This is said to have the serious fault of leaving it to 
“the philosopher” as an expert and not to citizens 
of an ongoing society to determine the political 
conception of justice. [Rawls refers to Habermas, 
1983]. The reply I make to his objection is that it 
is you and I – and so all citizens over time, one 
by one and in associations here and there – who 
judge the merits of the original position as a device 
of representation and the principles it yields. I 
deny that the original position is monological in 
a way that puts in doubt its soundness as a device 
of representation. (Rawls, 1995, fn. p. 140).
Already in his Theory of Justice, Rawls (1973) 
says that “one or more persons can at any time enter 
this position or […] simulate the deliberations of 
this hypothetical situation, simply by reasoning 
in accordance with the appropriate restrictions” 
(p. 138). So Habermas’ criticism misses the point 
of generalisation, but Rawls does not directly an-
swer the question of real discourse versus private 
contemplation.
For Rawls, universalisation is a consequence 
of freely choosing any citizen (untied by quanti-
fier), which leads to the conclusion that principles 
decided by that citizen are valid to all citizens, 
whereas for Habermas the universalisation is more 
straightforward, because he explicitly refers to 
all citizens (‘ideal role taking’). From the logical 
point of view their expressions amount to the same 
result, Rawls chooses ‘any citizen’ and Habermas 
uses the quantifier ‘all’.
We can think of the possibility of combining 
these seemingly opposing views within a given 
organisational context. From Habermas’ point 
of view the participants are known beforehand, 
although not necessarily all those affected by deci-
sions, and the decisions can be reached through 
rational argumentation. From Rawls’ point of 
view we can recognise here a special case of the 
original situation: the participants do not neces-
sarily know their position in the reorganised 
division of labour. This leads us to formulate 
the following principle of the universalisation of 
moral-practical discourse (modified from Visala, 
1993 and 1996):
Arguments assume a universal validity only to the 
extent that they do not appeal to personal interests; 
decisions are only backed up by arguments for 
the optimal total interest of the organisation and 
pass the tests for general human needs.
The combining of Habermas’ and Rawls’ ideas 
strengthens them both. Rawls’ notion of original 
position provides Habermas’ communicative 
rationality with a principle of what counts as a 
better argument.  The conditions of the original 
position are conditions of an ideal speech situa-
tion, even to the extent that they can be realised 
through the argument that biased personal needs 
do not count as a rational argument. Habermas’ 
idea of rational argumentation with the above 
supplementary principle provides Rawls’ notion 
of the veil of ignorance with practical implemen-
tation. The above principle works in a manner of 
Popper’s refutation principle: a universal proposi-
tion cannot be verified as true, but they can be 
refuted by one counter-example. 
How should we organise a discourse in order to 
reach rationally motivated consensus? A necessary 
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precondition for this is that the participants share a 
common view of validity claims, i.e. what counts as 
a valid argument. Habermas (1984) identifies four 
types of validity claims: truth, rightness, truthful-
ness (sincerity) and authenticity. The first three of 
them are relevant in the organisational context of 
this paper. Rightness refers to the normative and 
ethical values of arguments, truthfulness to the 
sincerity of a speaker, who expresses his or her 
emotions or opinions. Authenticity refers to the 
aesthetic value of a piece of art. Truthfulness is a 
precondition of any serious talk. There is no way 
of checking the validity of subjective expression 
through argumentation (Habermas, 1984, 303). 
As regards rightness, the above principle provides 
a means to test the universality of a claim. Truth 
is at first sight the most obvious validity claim, 
but as the long history of philosophy shows, it is 
a controversial one. Toulmin (1958) has given a 
concise formulation of how to use arguments: a 
claim is a statement expressed with conditional 
modal qualifiers, based on data, warrant and 
backing (p. 104). The ultimate ground for any 
rational discourse is a life-world shared by the 
members of society. They must have some com-
mon ‘preunderstanding’ of what counts as an 
undisputable fact, for example. What is meant 
by this is described best by Wittgenstein (1979). 
We have discussed the philosophical foundation 
of the rationality of argumentation elsewhere at 
some length (Visala 1993). This discussion will 
not be repeated here. 
tEcHNOLOGY aND PLaNNING
The above universalisation principle can be used 
as a rule of argumentation, when there is a plan 
to re-engineer the organisation by means of new 
technology. The guiding principle for arranging 
a discourse is that participants first agree on 
those issues that will be used as a backing for 
other claims and are thus more general in nature. 
A new technical production concept should be 
evaluated against efficiency objectives and envi-
ronmental constraints, for example. The process 
view of an organisation makes it possible for us 
to encounter a situation in which the division of 
labour can be discussed without referring to any 
existing organisational positions. There are no 
particular interest groups yet, as new tasks have 
not been allocated to anyone. The participants are 
in a kind of real original situation, and they can 
divide the tasks and the benefits attached to them 
under a veil of ignorance. A planner could serve 
as a facilitator of discourse and, in a manner of 
speaking, hold the veil of ignorance in front of 
the participants.
In accordance with Rawls’ difference prin-
ciple, the participants may end up with unequal 
shares of the outcome of the firm, if they are a 
way to get better total returns, i.e. more to share 
between stakeholders. However, the participants 
may come to some other conclusion as well, due 
to their shared values, which have been agreed 
upon during the discourse, or – what may be a 
more realistic assumption – due to regulations 
imposed on them. For example, new technology 
may not improve the returns of the firm (in the 
short run), but it is chosen because it is less pol-
luting. The purpose of this speculation is only to 
stress the point that Rawls’ original principles 
need not be assumed as necessary starting points 
for a discourse. (This debate could be continued 
further with the argument that non-polluting 
technology is chosen for the benefit of the future 
generations, etc.)
DIscUssION
The above principle still remains as an ideal ob-
jective. There are two obvious reasons leading 
to doubts as to whether it can be implemented 
directly in modern organisations. The first one 
follows from the prevalent organisational culture 
of Model I (control and competition, Argyris, 
1990). The second reason is the existing power 
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positions embedded in organisations that presume 
a certain inequality as a precondition for their 
existence. 
Argyris (1990, 13) sums up the Model I theory: 
“Model I theory-in-use instructs individuals to 
seek to be in unilateral control, to win, and not to 
upset people. It recommends action strategies that 
are primarily selling and persuading.”  However, 
Model I cannot find its justification in economic 
efficiency. It leads to skilled incompetence that 
actually inhibits everybody from utilising all their 
energy and leads to malfunctioning in the organi-
sation and defensive routines. These abandon the 
questioning of existing norms and values. Model I 
theory is not rational in economic sense, and hence 
executives should direct the organisation towards 
open discourse, i.e. Model II theory-in-use. The 
prevalent unilateral control ought to be replaced 
by bilateral control and power with competence 
and expertise (Argyris, 1990, 127).
The second obstacle leads to the same irrational 
consequences as the first one, although it is based 
on legal rules of market economy rather than any 
organisational tradition. Owners could also take 
into account how business organisations can 
benefit from rational argumentation: the success 
of the organisation is a common interest, and it 
can best be achieved when all relevant opinions 
can be expressed freely. However, regarding the 
present globalization and the accelerating pace of 
(quartile) economy this hope for a rational dis-
course between workers and stock owners seems 
utopian. Firms calculate the economic optimum on 
the basis of the marginal utility of labour. There 
is not much use for the better argument, when 
agents step out of the sphere of discourse to the 
world of sellers and buyers. Money then serves 
as a disembedding token and a medium of the 
transactions between people (Giddens, 1990), but 
it is a substitute of language that does not allow 
rationally motivated consensus through agree-
ment based on reason (Habermas, 1987). 
aDDItIONaL rEaDINGs
We may never reach sufficient control over the 
world by means of rational decisions, as there will 
always be hidden social and natural interactions 
and unexpected consequences. This only means 
a longer learning cycle: some day nature will 
hit back, and then we will learn from experi-
ence. We will realize that we have had too tight 
a system boundary. Conflicts between rivalling 
interest groups may have to be put on one side, 
when mankind encounters the common threat 
of climate change, for example. There is a long 
road to such a consensus because of the present 
unequal division of wealth. Can technology pro-
vide a solution, or is it a threat as such? At least 
the global information network gives us a forum 
for discourse, and a chance to evaluate our own 
values against those of others. Senge’s influential 
work (2006) opens up yet another universalisa-
tion perspective of systems thinking in learning 
organisations and society in the large.
cONcLUsION
This chapter has proposed an universalisation 
principle that combines Rawls’ notion of justice 
as fairness derived ‘behind a veil of ignorance’ 
and Habermas’ ethical doctrine that is based on 
discourse in an ideal speech situation. Technologi-
cal development provides a special motivation for 
this principle, because it may give an opportunity 
to a new division of labour. The members of the 
organization are then in a manner of speaking 
behind the veil of ignorance, when they do not 
know their future position. Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action sets the rules for organis-
ing rational discourse which gives all members 
an opportunity to express their opinion in the 
matter, but without possibility of referring to 
their own special interests. Modern network com-
munities provide another link to technology and 
one that may facilitate to expand the discourse 
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over organisational boarders. The issue will be 
discussed elsewhere in this volume.
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KEY tErMs
Categorical Imperative (Kant): “So act that 
the maxim of your will could always hold at the 
same time as the principle of universal legislation” 
(Critic of Practical Reason, A, 54).
Veil Of Ignorance: A person makes his or 
her ethical choice without knowing his or her 
share of the utilities ensuing from the principles 
and his or her social circumstances or personal 
characteristics.
Discourse in an Ideal Speech Situation: The 
participants have symmetrical and equal chances 
to express their opinions and raise questions about 
any issue.
